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. . . a practice of social and historical explanation, sensitive to structure but aware of contingency, is not yet at hand. We must build it as we go along, by reconstructing the available tools of social science and social theory. Its absence denies us a credible account of how transformation happens. (Unger, 1998: 24) 'A PRACTICE OF social and historical explanation, sensitive to structure but aware of contingency' -Unger is demanding a social science as a basis for social action -a programme which explains how things are as they are so that we might understand how to make different futures, and futures which are radically different -transformed. His is not a lone voice. Latour (2001, n.d.) , in a programme of civic and cultural engagement, has not only remarked on the breakdown between the domains of scientific knowledge and experimental practice on the one hand, and political action informed by value systems on the other, but has also called for simulation as a basis for informing public understanding and political practice:
The third type of event, much more risky and difficult to express but indispensable, is a Simulation [original emphasis] at various scales of real debates on pending issues to present to the public the various possible solutions of what could be due process in matters of scientific democracy, or what Sheila Jasanoff has proposed calling civic epistemology. (n.d.) Of course Latour is a constructionist -a practitioner of what Pawson and Tilley call 'Hermeneutics II' (1997: 21) -and, in relation to the field of scientific knowledge, ends up with a conventionalist story of the products of science. Desrosières (1998) , an explicit follower of Latour, has taken this account into the realm of knowledge in the form of official statisticsperhaps the most significant of all knowledge forms for the practice of politics in post-industrial post-democracies, 1 where social being might be considered to be constituted through practices of consumption and politics is acutely concerned with the representation of the standard of public services, through statistical measures of standards and targets achieved, to the public as consumers.
Where Latour is an epistemological constructionist; Unger's position is characteristically realist. And yet even Latour is asking for a science -a knowledge set -which informs the discussion of alternatives in policy formation. Unger goes further. He recognizes not the conventionalism of knowledge -an inherently epistemological position -but the contingency of the world -a world both social and natural -which that knowledge must describe. His is a plea for a different form of science founded on this ontological recognition -for knowledge that is local rather than universal -for an abandonment of the dichotomy between nomothetic and ideographic.
The purpose of this article is to argue first, in a general sense, that complexity science provides a systematic -and that word is used here absolutely literally -foundation for the kind of social science that Unger is seeking as the basis for a knowledge-based politics at every level, but particularly that of popular participatory practice. Complexity provides a foundation for one side of the debate specified by Paulo Freire as the foundation of dialogical social research as part of a programme of participatory politics. Freire's ideas and practices have been taken far too little notice of in the North, outside the extra-academic ghettoes of community development and adult education. In the South they are fundamental to some of the most radical institutional and processual developments in popular politics, through the Brazilian Workers' Party. 2 The lack of attention to Freire reflects both the contemporary weakness of Philosophy of Education, 3 particularly in the UK, and a continued incapacity on the part of Northern intellectuals in the post-communist era to engage outwith the academy and liberal educated elites.
The argument will then proceed by arguing against a specific, and in the Anglo-Saxon scientific community currently dominant, mode of complexity in which general simple rules which drive complex emergence are seen as appropriate replacements for universal laws. Instead we should engage with complex complexity, and do so through methods which enable us to delve into complex causal processes through a reconsideration of the nature and potential of that most distinctive of sociological techniques -the comparative method. It will do so for three reasons. First, complexity must become more than a metaphorical apparatus in social science and this can only happen if the complexity frame of reference shapes the actual tools of investigative social science themselves. Second, the comparative method is particularly well suited for explication of the character of such shaping, both intrinsically -since recognition of complex causation has always been a foundation of the comparative approach -and in relation to the limitations of many social scientists who do not possess the vocabulary necessary to engage with serious quantitative investigative tools. Finally, the comparative method employed at the level of neighbourhood and city region has very considerable potential for informing the participatory process in policy formation and implementation -for serving as a basis for what is actually an ongoing process very little noticed by social theorists but one with very considerable implications for the nature of politics in post-democratic societies.
establishing how things have come to be as they are is valid in the complexity frame of reference. Urry's recent Global Complexity (2002) exemplifies the use of the language of complexity theory as a method of describing a current system state through his account of the character of global systems at the level of the macro-social. 5 Complexity is an idea whose time has come. And it has come because the complexity frame of reference enables us to do exactly what Unger specifies as the necessary task of social science and to do it in just the way he suggests for us -through reconstruction. We can go forward not by importing a whole new set of tools and meta-theoretical specifications from somewhere else, but by reconstructing the tools and theories that we already have in complexity terms.
Let us pay attention first to the necessity of the task. This article is written in the spirit of an unregenerate progressive modernism -in the belief that social science in a dialogue with collective experience has something to contribute to the resolution of the human condition. It is written in support of the importance of empirical investigation and against both the sterility of structuralism, magisterially dismissed by E.P. Thompson in The Poverty of Theory (1978) , with its anti-empirical claim to a deductive and general account of social process, and the disengagement of relativist poststructuralism as the meta theory of postmodernity from any practical engagement at all of social science with processes of social transformation. It also rejects the elitist turn taken by Flyvbjerg (2001) towards 'phronesis' -the virtuoso performance of the social scientist as elite gentleman. If we are to use Aristotelian terminology, then what follows is an argument for techne as the basis of praxis, but for a techne that does have a specific episteme to underpin it. This is an argument for the complexity frame of reference as a way of informing half of the dialogue of reflexive participatory social research, and a proposal for a reconfigured version of the comparative method as a key tool in the toolbox of the social scientist as craft worker. And this is a task of reconstruction -not of importation. Hayles (1991: 7) made a very important point about the complexity project in its preliminary form of 'chaos theory' when she denied the primacy of 'scientistic' chaos and argued that the theme of chaos was everywhere in the episteme. Complexity theory is not a matter of importing ideas from 'the hard sciences' into the consideration of the social, although some of the terminology of nonlinear dynamic theory can be rather useful to us. Rather it involves thinking about the social world and its intersections with the natural world as involving dynamic open systems with emergent properties that have the potential for qualitative transformation, and examining our traditional tools of social research with this perspective informing that examination. The idea of complex systems in its essential form is not a new thing. If we adopt the Gulbenkian Commission's very useful definition of science as 'systematic secular knowledge about reality that is somehow validated empirically ' (1996: 2) , then the complexity science programme is at least as old as modernity, although we have not had that name to give to it. McKeown 98 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) (1979) got it absolutely right when he identified the understanding of the relationships among human social organization, the urban environment and infectious diseases as the greatest contribution of medical science to human progress. 6 That understanding, developed in its essentials in the second quarter of the 19th century, was essentially a complexity-based account of how the natural world, social structure and social action interacted. Moreover, it constituted a complex science which informed human actions that changed the character of urban natural/social 7 environments and engendered the health transition 8 which has transformed human demography and is transforming human history.
The history of epidemiology is one in which the complexity-based understanding of early modernity was challenged by the analytical and simple understanding made possible by the empirical validation of the germ theory of infectious disease -the main support to this day of medicine's commitment to specific aetiology. The analytical programme of simple science triumphed both over the case knowledge of pre-modern medicine and the complex social understandings of early modern 9 public health. The prime purpose of this article is to argue for a complex version of case-based methods derived from casting recent developments in the comparative method in complex terms. In so doing it will argue against simplicity and against 'simplistic scientistic' complexity. At the same time it will be unremittingly hostile to the 'post-explanatory' turn of much of contemporary 'social science'. Complexity specifies knowledge as local but not as relative. It always understands knowledge as socially constructed but not as reified. Harvey (1992, 1996) have indicated the congruence in this respect of complexity with the programme of 'scientific realism' and that position is endorsed here. We are in the business of elucidating how things change, even if our methods are radically different from the dominant form of scientific explanation through analysis and reduction. 10 Moreover, we can use these methods as part of a dialogical engagement with human agents rather than the decomposition of the complex social through analysis based on the reification of variables. Complexity understood in this way validates the engagement of science with reflexive social action.
Abbott, who has directly engaged with the case-based methods which will be the basis of the substantive discussion in this article, has argued that:
. . . the larger, universal framework for social science is by no means the standard, often-parodied axiomatic structure. Rather it resembles what the Romans called the law of peoples (ius gentium), a law that they applied to diverse groups at the edges of empire and that they distinguished from the formalized civil law (ius civile) that applied specifically to Roman citizens. There is no universal social scientific knowledge of the latter kind -systematic, axiomatic, universal in a contentless sense. There is only universal knowledge of the former kind, a universal knowledge emerging from accommodation and conflict rather than from axioms, a universal knowledge that provides tentative bridges between local knowledges rather than Byrne -Complexity, Configurations and Cases 99 systematic maps that deny them, a universal knowledge that aims, like the ius gentium, at allowing interchange among people who differ fundamentally. (2001: 5) That is a good basis on which to proceed.
Putting Social Science to Work
As always with complexity, context is everything and the present context for social science, particularly in the UK, is one in which considerable demands are being made on the social scientific project -in effect to put up or shut up. The recent Academy of Learned Societies for the Social Sciences report, Great Expectations (2003) , addressed the potential of social science as a basis for policy formation and social practice. That report is banal, defensive and utilitarian in the extreme. Nevertheless, the requirement that social science speaks to audiences beyond the academy is appropriate, although the tone of a complexity-informed dialogue may be more critical than the authors of Great Expectations would welcome. Moreover, within the academy itself, complexity-informed assertion will disturb those who are complacent about some rather self-confident disciplines. Great Expectations explicitly rejected the Gulbenkian Commission's wholly accurate assessment of the failure of nomothetic social science to deliver any sort of foundation for prediction in relation to social action. The Gulbenkian report was informed by the complexity frame of reference, through the participation on the commission of Prigogine. It did not conclude for an abstract and disengaged project of relativist reflection, but rather sought to move things on beyond the sterility of positivist science and linear modelling. It proposed, inter alia, a complexity turn.
This has very considerable salience. Policy-makers and practitioners perfectly reasonably expect science -defined in the Gulbenkian fashion as above -to deliver some sort of answer to the pertinent question: what works? Indeed, contra Weber, most social scientists do hanker for a role in the informing of the democratic process, the essential politics of modernity. However, given the relativist turn in social meta-theory, it often seems as if the task of informing policy elites has been willingly ceded to a revived crude positivism in which the randomized controlled trial is hailed as the 'gold standard of evaluation'. The task of informing democratic debate seems to have been ceded to mass media dominated by corporate interests! Interestingly, the main challenge in terms of evaluation, and so far the only one that has had any impact on the policy process, has come from a critical realist turn which is wholly compatible with the complexity perspective (see Pawson and Tilley, 1997) . The engagement of social scientists with policy is not a straightforward process. In particular such engagement poses dangers for the critical function of social science as commentary and as practice. Complexity does have potential for engagement, although one version of complexity would deliver an engagement which would replicate the worst technocratic elitism of early attempts to inform policy through 100 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) systems-theory-based approaches. One of the tasks being attempted here is to argue that a different fix on complexity and a different approach to method has a radical and emancipatory potential. It certainly can inform evaluation, but it can go beyond that to inform democratic political practice as social action.
It is necessary in writing about complexity to move beyond the preliminary specification of the general character of complexity science and the delivery of glossaries of its terminology. Let us agree that we are involved in a project of discovering complexity, that like the scientists studied by Bechtel and Richards, we are:
. . . not primarily interested in general laws; [but rather are seeking] to identify causal components that explained how various systems produced specific phenomena. (1993: xi) In other words as Cilliers (1998) has demonstrated, the essential character of complexity-based knowledge is that it is local. The big question is how can we interrogate the local to understand how things have come to be as they are and how they might be made different. Here social science has something to it which is singularly lacking in the 'hard sciences' other than implicitly in ecology. It understands how to compare. Much of 'scientistic complexity' is concerned with the dynamic trajectories of individual systems. We as social scientists can deal with -to use the terminologyensembles of systems. We can deal with lots of cases and see how the configurations they represent can help us to understand the various ways in which things have come to be as they are, the various ways in which they might be different, and -with luck and the wind in the right quarter -how social action might produce one possible future rather than another.
So we need a comparative complexity method -and the central argument of this article is that we have one in the form of a complexitybased interpretation of Charles Ragin's 'fuzzy set' qualitative comparative analysis. However, before we come to that we need to clear the ground a little. We need to examine simplistic and rule-based complexity and distinguish it absolutely from case-based empirical investigation. Having done that, we can examine case-based methods and see if they do offer us a new way of seeing how things have come to be. Then we can return to the 'big issue' -to the assertion of complexity approaches as precisely the foundation of an engaged social science which can help us to understand how transformations happen and how we might, dialogically, engage in making them happen. and where that programme works it has done great service in elucidating causality. The problem is that it works where it works and it does not work everywhere. Indeed in a natural/social world the range of its applicability is rather limited. The problem is that, instead of the application of the simple model being understood as something that always has to be justified by showing that what is being dealt with can be analysed, the simple model is taken as 'the scientific model', which is always applicable. The dominant contemporary modes of statistical reasoning in the social sciences are a particular example of this (see Byrne, 2002) .
Before trying to put complexity to work we need to delimit a very special sort of complex reasoning which takes the simple model as its template and which, like the simple model itself, asserts general applicability. Whereas the long-term project of the simple model as 'the scientific method' is the establishment of universal laws which apply always and everywhere, the project of what I am going to call -in a deliberately oxymoronic fashion -simplistic complexity, is the establishment of a general set of rules from which emergent complexity flows. There are important differences between the simple model and simplistic complexity. In the simple model, knowledge of the law and of initial conditions of the system enables prediction of future states of the system. In simplistic complexity knowledge of the rules does not, in principle, allow us to predict in this way. Rules are not laws. Laws describe the behaviour of the system as a whole. Rules define the range of action of components of the system.
The difference between simplicity and simple complexity can be illustrated by comparing a system described by a set of simultaneous equations and a system modelled in a simulation. A mathematical model cast as a set of equations enables, in principle, absolute prediction. A simulation can be set running to see what happens and what happens can be used as a prediction of what might happen in reality, but there is no established law to validate that prediction. Of course the key issue for both mathematical models and simulations is the degree of isomorphism with the real system of which either is a representation. Indeed, those mathematical models that go beyond the trivially simple are in some respects more like simulations than they are like the simplest mathematical models. Only the simplest mathematical models can be validated by hypothesis testing. Nonetheless the equation set does fully describe a mathematical model. In a simulation the rules simply describe how things get done.
Simple complexity does permit emergence -emergence is the whole point of it and Emergence is the title of Holland's (1998) canonical text. The point is that the rules in simple complexity are themselves simple. For example, in a cellular automaton such as the Game of Life, very simple rules lead to complex emergent forms over a number of iterations. Simple complexity is very attractive to the scientistic programme. It cannot establish laws but it can establish rules which seem to describe lots of systems and the establishment of the rules has the same general character and, very important this, status, as the establishment of scientific laws. Hayles, in her review of the history of cybernetics, employed the archaeological term skeuomorph -a design feature which no longer has any function but served some purpose in earlier periods. For cybernetics she argues, skeumorphs served as threshold devices smoothing the transitions in understanding and (in consequence) method. Using this terminology we might see 'simple complexity' as a kind of meta-skeuomorph which keeps simulation as acceptable scientism despite the profound anti-simplification content of the whole idea of complexity, the inexorable character of the real as opposed to the artificial. This is why simplistic complexity is so attractive to the worst sort of evolutionary psychology 11 and contemporary ideologues of market models. 12 Write a few rules -the selfish gene, the territorial imperative, profit maximization, rational choice, or, preferably, a combination of all of these, and away we go. Simplistic complexity does deal with a kind of complex emergence but it remains reductionist.
Simulation as a method, at the current level of development of simulation tools, is based on simplistic complexity. It may be that simulation has the potential to be developed beyond this but for that to happen software developers will have to find a means of representing not just agents but social structure -with all the complexities and contradictions that that metaphor implies. Agent-based simulations can generate emergent structure but in the real social world structure is the product not just of contemporary actions but of history. It is there as we act although our actions constitute it and change it. In other words, a simulation that would be adequate as a representation of the social complex cannot start from agents alone. This is not to dismiss simulation, or indeed to dismiss simplistic complexity as a mode of reasoning. Rather, as with simplicity, the application of simplistic complexity must always be justified by at least an argument to the effect that the system(s) being represented can be described in simplistic complex terms. For Holland and those who follow his approach, simplistic rule-based complexity is everywhere and science is just a matter of establishing, or more often asserting, the rules. This is very different from the careful empirical work of some sociologists, anthropologists and ecologists who are using simulation approaches. For example Chattoe and Gilbert (1995) used interviews to establish budgetary behaviour among a particular set of consumers before formulating rules for agents in a simulation. Likewise Doran and Palmer (1995) based their simulations of upper palaeolithic social change on archaeological evidence about human groups in that period. In other words, these 'empirically based' simulators did look at the systems they were concerned with and, implicitly at least, ascertained that simplistic complexity could serve to describe them. In general simplistic complexity is appropriate for real micro-social phenomena which may nonetheless have macro-social implications. Schelling (1978) produced a convincing cellular-automaton-based simulation of segregation in US cities which at least raised the issue that an important part of the mechanism that Byrne -Complexity, Configurations and Cases 103 generated observed segregation was the desire by families, both black and white, to live in areas in which their own ethnic group was the majority, although they did not want to live in completely segregated areas. To say this is not to deny institutional racism and other determinants, but it is to say that micro-social actions may have unintended macro-social consequences.
So simplistic complexity is fine as a modest basis for exploratory empirically grounded simulations but when it is asserted as the basis of everything, then turn off the sound. If the sound is not turned off, then simplistic complexity, with an apparatus of technical model-building and the potential for close association with deterministic 'bio-social' theorizing, could very well acquire the kind of status in relation to policy formation and development currently occupied by simplistic science. Indeed simulations are already in use, although the foundations of such simulations often lack the empirical foundation which careful social science simulation brings to rule specification. The simulation of foot and mouth in the UK was a pertinent example. Bizarrely, but of course not surprisingly in relation to the findings of science studies, accuracy of prediction is not a requirement for status in terms of the relationship between scientific technique and policy processes.
More directly, and in particular in urban planning, simplistic complexity is already demonstrating considerable potential for supporting a combination of technocratic elitism and market determination in the setting of urban futures. There was a good deal wrong with the old 'evangelistic bureaucrats' who drew on simple systems theory in the days when planning was conceived of as a social-democratic activity. Simplistic complexity informing urban simulations of catalysed markets would be a good deal worse. But there is an alternative!
Comparing Cases -A Complex Fix on the Comparative Method
Ragin, in his recent book Fuzzy-set Social Science, refers to:
. . . an idea widely shared by social scientists -that it is possible to derive useful empirical generalizations from the examination of multiple instances of social phenomena (i.e. from comparable cases). (2000: 332) That is a pretty good specification of the essentials of the comparative method. Let us see what complexity might tell us about cases and their trajectories, and then compare the implications of a complex account of the case with Ragin's understanding of cases as 'configurations'. This will offer us an actual method for exploring complexity and complex causation, which not only corresponds to one of the foundational techniques of social science, but can be the basis for dialogically engaged action-research for social change. In other words, we might be able to go beyond understanding social transformations towards a programme for shaping those transformations.
104 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) The essence of the case in a complex frame is that cases are in themselves complex systems which are nested in, have nested within them, and intersect with other complex systems. So, for example, a city-region is nested within global and national systems and has nested within it neighbourhoods, households and individuals. Nesting is not hierarchy. Determination runs in all possible directions, not just top down. All these levels potentially have implications for all other levels. However, as well as these elements which might be described by a hierarchical data system, there are other systems which intersect with them, cut across them, constitute part of them and are constituted by them. What is a system of interest at any point in time is defined by observation and action. Boundaries depend on what we are looking for and at. This is not to say that boundaries are arbitrary, relative or unreal. At one level the geography of city region is real. With another focus of attention the global socio-scape of an immigrant household is real. Each matters for the other.
The trajectories of systems are the histories of cases. The trajectories of complex systems have histories that are a mixture of 'much the same' and change. For much of the time complex systems remain the same sort of thing. There are changes in them over time but these do not constitute changes of kind. To use attractor labels, the systems are in a torus attractor. The changes that matter are in complex systems' terminology phase shifts, and what social science generally, after Polyani, calls transformations. The language of transformation is essentially dialectical. We see changes of quantity become changes of quality. The accumulation of continuous change leads to the crossing of a threshold of kind. So, for our example, a city-region might move from an industrial to post-industrial character. However, the forms available to post-industrial cities are multiple. There is not one kind of post-industrial city. Rather, there is a range of possible post-industrial forms, even within a particular global system. Moreover, and this is the point about the non-hierarchical character of nesting and intersection, different trajectories attained by city-regions (the active form of the verb is very deliberate) have the potential to influence the form of the global system as a whole. It should be evident that, at the very least, we will be interested in what sorts of actions might generate a particular outcome from a post-industrial transformation locally. Beyond this, the emergent consequences of varied local trajectories for the global system as a whole, will matter for us.
This project is necessarily one of seeking to establish causes. However, it is evident that causal processes in complex systems cannot be accessed by simple analysis. The trajectories of complex systems will always be directed by complex and contingent cause. History will matter. There will be path dependency. Context will matter. Agency will matter. This account of causation corresponds exactly with the essentials of the scientific realist description of cause as Harvey (1992, 1996) have indicated.
Compare this with Ragin:
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For causation, the main contrast is between the conventional view of causation as a contest between individual variables to explain variation in an outcome and the diversity-oriented view that causation is both conjunctural and multiple. In the conventional view, each single causal condition, conceived as an analytically distinct variable, has an independent impact on the outcome. In the diversity-oriented view, causes combine in different and sometimes contradictory ways to produce the same outcome, revealing different paths. (2000: 15) This is the same thing said in a slightly different way, with one very interesting additional twist. Ragin points out that the same outcome might be produced by different causal combinations. There are different ways to the same future.
To develop this point let me elaborate on Ragin's notion of configuration. Ragin seems to have developed his arguments in isolation from the critical realist tradition and with limited (up to now) explicit reference to complexity theory and the vocabulary of open systems, but his essential account is substantially identical. For him;
. . . cases are viewed as configurations -as combinations of characteristics. Comparison in the qualitative tradition thus involves comparing configurations. This holism contradicts the radically analytic approach of most quantitative work. (1987: 3) This resembles Elias's view, 13 when he remarked that what is required is to:
. . . investigate the nature of this range of possible transformations and the configuration of factors responsible for the fact that, of all of the possibilities, only this one is materialized. (1970 ( , cited in Noves, 2002 However, Elias was dealing with a single trajectory. Ragin, although dealing at the same macro-social level as Elias in empirical work, deals with multiple cases. Nonetheless configuration here is used as a way of expressing complex and contingent cause. This is not the place for a full elaboration of Ragin's approach, although some colouring is appropriate. Basically Ragin has developed and refined a 'small N'-based method in which Boolean truth tables are constructed as a way of representing specific configurations which have engendered particular trajectories towards an outcome. This is work in the US macro-social tradition of seeking to delineate the causal processes in social transformation and it has had most influence where sociology and political science intersect in the study of 'international relations'. In his most recent book, Ragin has become ever more assertive in his dismissal of an analytical and variablecentred mode of causal reasoning and now argues that:
Fuzzy sets offer researchers an interpretive algebra, a language that is half verbal-conceptual and half mathematical-analytical. . . . Most theoretical 106 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) arguments, as verbal formulations, deal with set-theoretic relationships, so they offer the opportunity for creating a close correspondence between theory and data analysis. (2000: 4) For me this resonates absolutely with understanding complex systems as best explored by taxonomic procedures -what Ragin would call the establishment of differences of kind. But he also argues that we must pay attention to:
The second aspect of diversity [which] involves the varying degrees of membership that instances may exhibit in the categories and types used to categorize them. . . . The key to understanding the power of fuzzy sets is to see that it is possible to specify qualitative breakpoints on continua and to incorporate these qualitative breakpoints directly into the analysis of evidence that varies by level. With fuzzy sets, researchers can analyze settheoretic relationships while still attending to phenomena that vary by level or degree. They do not have to forfeit the study of variation by level in order to study cases as configurations or to explore causal complexity. (2000: 16) This is very interesting because it provides us with a way of understanding measurements, taken as variate traces of the character of open systems (see Byrne, 2002) , which points us towards the significance of threshold values as indicators of system change -indicators, not causes. The crossing of thresholds indicates a difference of kind. In complexity terminology we have markers for phase shifts.
Ragin's is not the only approach that has this character but it is probably the most clearly articulated. What is most interesting is that 'postanalytical' research strategies, grounded in processes of comparison, are emerging across the quantitative and qualitative research programmes in social science. This is particularly so where the quantitative and qualitative intersect and the development seems to be in considerable part driven by the potential of computer technology and its capacity to serve us as 'macroscope' (see Byrne, 2002) . Cilliers (1998) was making a very important point with profound implications when he noted that we might be able to do with technology what we cannot do with science. That is to say we can scan, describe and represent using computing technology without a law-based model of the processes being represented. Here the commercial development of data-mining tools using neural net technology is extremely interesting. In any event the point is, that as Hayles noted for the ideas themselves, complexity-based reasoning and tool-building is popping up all over the place, whatever name we care to put on it. It is in the episteme, in the culture, and in the theory. So, what can we do with it?
Complexity and Social Practice -Regaining Confidence If we are going to have an engaged social science then the character of the process of engagement will, in the best complexity fashion, be inseparable from the modes of reasoning which inform that engagement. Complexity Byrne -Complexity, Configurations and Cases 107 theory, particularly simplistic complexity theory, looks like the property of an intellectual elite who claim technical expertise can engage with real human systems in processes of social engineering. That is one way things might go. It is not what is being proposed here.
Instead -assertively and at the risk of pretentiousness -it is argued that complexity does offer an historically grounded frame of reference which can be used to inform the organic practice of intellectuals engaged in participatory research. Action-research has developed as a research practice in a range of applied fields in the social sciences, but the implications of the process have not informed meta-methodological debate. Original interventions in action-research argued for strict experimental designs, but, under the influence of practice and of the pedagogical theories of Paulo Freire, there has been a general shift towards dialogical modes of engagement with social actors in the research field. This means that scientistsin the Gulbenkian sense of this role -do not confine their engagement with social actors to the elicitation of information but, in the process of research, feedback in which there is a dialogue both as to the validity of account and as to its implications for practice. This has much in common, although there does not seem to be much if any cross-referencing, with integrative method as proposed by Lemon (1999) , which is explicitly complexity-based. The point about action-research is that it takes the process of reflexivity out of the epistemological ghetto and into social life. It is reflexivity that leads not to relativistic passivity but rather to engagement in action. In this respect it meets Paul Cilliers' requirement that those who wish to engage with complex social systems must, ethically, do so from within those systems.
The actual scale of evaluative and action-research in contemporary post-industrial and post-democratic societies is enormous. The UK is an extreme case but here almost all the policy initiatives of New Labour since 1997 have involved both action-research and proposals for systematic evaluation. Most of the 'applied funding' for UK social science comes in relation to these modes of intervention. 14 Little of this work is dialogical and virtually none of it is informed by a complexity frame of reference. It just gets done without any real debate about its nature, purposes and consequences. An important objective of this piece is the raising of questions about this form of practice as part of the general debate about complexity in social science as a whole. The intention has been to get beyond simple rejection. Social science will be applied. The intention here has been to use complexity as a mode of understanding and on that basis develop some ideas about how a meaningful practice of applied research might be developed. 108 Theory, Culture & Society 22(5) 3. Durkheim's first Chair was in Philosophy of Education. For much of the 20th century radical pedagogy was the most important social practice informed by any philosophical notion of 'critique'. 4. This question is of course not meaningful in other languages where the word commonly used to translate the English word 'science' includes all organized secular knowledge. 5. One important point about complexity theory is that it resonates with other accounts which use a somewhat different, although often overlapping, vocabulary. In terms of the macro-social processes with which Urry is concerned, an important resonance is with figurational sociology as proposed by Elias in a series of works. 6. This word is not used innocently as we shall see. 7. It is wrong to say natural and social. The point is that the environment is emergent from the natural and social and is both and more than both. 8. This expression refers to the sudden and qualitative change of the pattern of death in human societies which began in the West in the late 19th century and is now almost global. Before this, in urban and agricultural societies most deaths were due to infectious diseases and happened across the age range, but particularly in infancy and childhood. Now most people die in old age of non-infectious conditions. 9. A teacher at the University of Durham has to specify that here early modern here does not mean 6th century but rather early modernity. 10. The argument for the congruence between complexity as a scientific ontology and realism as a philosophical ontology is well made by Reed and Harvey (1992) . In brutal summary we might say that both derive from a concern with the nature of what is. This means that epistemological arguments about how we know have to be answered in a way which derives from that specification of the nature of the objects of knowledge. This approach resonates with the arguments advanced by Lakoff and Johnson (1999) for an embodied theory of mind and an evolutionary understanding of perception and cognition. 11. There is a much more subtle and interesting evolutionary psychology which takes the Darwinian programme but deals in terms of cognitive, linguistic and cultural emergence rather than genetic imperatives. 12. Upon whom a reincarnated Adam Smith would not make water were they spontaneously to ignite. 13. The revived interest in figurational sociology, which derives in very considerable part from a return to Elias's work, is significant in two senses. It reinforces the validity of comparative method at the level of the macro-social. Indeed, little macrosocial work outside this tradition gets beyond simple generative determinism typified by Castells' techno-deterministic version of his original Althusserian project. It also reflects a desire by sociologists for an explanatory framework that does not reduce to epistemological rhetoric. 14. Interestingly, explicit adherents of generally postmodernist meta-theoretical positions often seem quite happy to take money for research projects in which evaluation is cast in an entirely scientistic mode.
